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The increasing cost of manpower in the United States Navy and the decline of the
defense budget generated a new initiative called the Smart Ship Program. Smart Ship,
using a combination of technology and nontraditional policies and procedures to reduce
manning on U.S. naval vessels, was first implemented on the USS Yorktown (CG 48).
However, some of the technology and concepts were not readily transferable to other ship
classes. The USS Rushmore (LSD 47) was chosen to implement and evaluate Smart Ship
concepts on an amphibious ship through the Smart Gator Program. This thesis evaluated
the impact of Smart Gator on the mission readiness of the Rushmore by conducting
interviews with key Smart Gator Program personnel, reviewing pertinent data and
analyzing the Rushmore's Engineering Certification Report of October 1998. This study
shows that the initial reduction in manpower, combined with increased training required
on new equipment, produced an increase in the crew's workload and negatively impacted
mission readiness. Additionally, the interviews indicate that Navy research and
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Commanding Officers of Navy ships have dealt with the
issues of proper manning and mission readiness for
centuries. The mission readiness of any sea-going vessel
requires that each person onboard be skilled in a wide
variety of maritime duties, including routine watchstanding,
planned and corrective maintenance, basic housekeeping, and
most importantly, damage control. Aboard United States Navy
vessels, every crewmember has multiple responsibilities
based on the ship's operating environment. Maximum readiness
to operate in any given environment can only be achieved by
conducting quality training, and by having sufficient
personnel to safely carry out assigned tasks for the
duration of the operation.
Although technological advancement has drastically
improved the capabilities and living conditions of Navy
vessels over the years, the optimum number of personnel per
vessel remains a delicate issue that has been amplified in
the post-Cold War era. Operators assigned to ships
constantly seek ways to enhance mission readiness and
quality of life, which is primarily achieved by increasing
the number of qualified personnel onboard through training.
However, a ship must first have a sufficient number of
personnel to conduct training. Unfortunately, shrinking
budgets have forced the Navy to reduce operating costs by
reducing manning, since the active duty military personnel
Navy (MPN) budget constitutes 20 percent of the Department
of the Navy total, and is its second largest appropriation.
[Ref. 1] This conflicts with the orientation of operators
towards redundancy in every critical system and at every
critical position.
In spite of budget and personnel issues, Commanding
Officers and their crews continue to carry out assigned
missions with apparent ease. However, the reduction in
forces has taken its toll. As President Reagan's initiative
for a 600-ship Navy in the early 1980 's has been effectively
cut in half, the number of contingencies requiring U.S. Navy
presence has steadily increased. Unrest in Bosnia, Somalia,
West Africa, Haiti, Korea and the Persian Gulf over the last
five years has stretched the fleet significantly. This
statement from the Navy's 1998 Posture Statement captures
the result:
"Although the incremental costs for contingency
operations are relatively small due to our forward presence,
we must still divert programmed operations, maintenance, and
training funds away from non-deployed forces to support such
requirements. " [Ref. 2:Ch 5]
These changes have had a direct impact on quality of
life, which is generally defined by the number of working
hours and the amount of time spent away from home. Navy
recruiting and retention have decreased over the past few
years as a result. [Ref. 2:Ch 4] Unfortunately, in the
post-Cold War era, the shrinking defense budget requires a
policy of reduced operating costs while maintaining mission




Before the 1970 's, the cost of manpower was a
comparatively small part of the Navy's annual budget. With
the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973,
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Before the 1970 's, the cost of manpower was a
comparatively small part of the Navy's annual budget. With
the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973,
military pay began to rise in an attempt to recruit young
Americans with pay equivalent to the civilian sector. There
were no alternatives; pay had to increase to meet the demand
of force structure required to operate a growing Department
of Defense. [Ref. 3:p. 6]
However, even with increased pay, recruitment continued
to be a problem. Many operational units experienced
shortfalls in the mid-level petty officer ranks. These were
the ranks that maintained the knowledge base for maintenance
and operation throughout the fleet. By 1980, there was a
shortage of some 23,300 Petty Officers and retention was
only 50.5 percent for second-termers. [Ref. 4:p. 152] It
was not until President Reagan gained office in 1981 that
military pay, benefits and retention began to rebound.
Under President Reagan and Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman, the U.S. Navy developed and implemented a plan for a
600-ship Navy. [Ref. 5:p. iii] The Navy needed to increase
manpower in order to meet the requirements of the larger
fleet.
In the early 1990 's, Admiral Boorda realized manpower
was not being used effectively throughout the fleet. "For
my entire thirty-nine year career, we always talked about
buying ships and manning them with people. . .1 think we need
to think about things differently now. We need to figure
out how to have the fewest number of people possible, and
then build [ships] to make them as effective as they need to
be." [Ref. 6:p. 21] After the completion of a study by the
Naval Research Advisory Committee, Admiral Boorda requested
a test platform to examine and validate recommendations for
manpower reductions on a surface combatant. [Ref. 6:p. 83]
As a result of the study and Admiral Boorda 's interest,
the Smart Ship Project was initiated in 1995, and hundreds
of technological ideas to reduce manpower were forwarded to
Washington, D.C. [Refs. 7, 8] Many focused on the procedures
of the merchant fleet. The USS Yorktown (CG 48) was chosen
as the pilot platform for the Navy in November 1995. [Ref.
9] Since the Yorktown is a cruiser, some of the new
technologies, policy changes and equipment installations
were not readily transferable to amphibious ships.
Consequently, in the fall of 1996, Commander Naval
Surface Forces Pacific (SURFPAC) and Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) initiated the Smart Ship Program aboard the
amphibious dock landing ship, USS Rushmore (LSD 47). [Ref.
10] In addition to Smart Ship technologies, NAVSEA also
seized the opportunity to test equipment that is being
implemented on the 21 st century amphibious ship, USS San
Antonio (LPD-17). Thus the program was named Gator-17.
[Ref. 10] For the purposes of this thesis the program will
be referred to as "Smart Gator".
C . OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact
of Smart Gator as it pertains to the mission readiness of
amphibious ships. The primary question the study will
address is:
Has the Smart Gator Program impacted the Required
Operational Capability of the USS Rushmore? Subsidiary
questions include the following:
1. What significant factors were considered prior to
initiating the Smart Gator Program on USS Rushmore?




What are the advantages and disadvantages of
implementation?
4. How are the routine and special evolution
watchteams organized?
5 How are manpower savings determined?
6. Is the Smart Gator effective according to SURFPAC




Are the current Smart Gator concepts and technical
applications working?
8. What alternatives are available for current
amphibious ships to reduce manpower?
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
This study will focus on the impact of the Smart Gator
Program on the mission readiness of USS Rushmore and provide
recommendations to enhance the implementation of the program
on other amphibious ships. Cost-benefit analyses of reduced
manning will be limited to studies previously conducted by
Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific (SURFPAC) and Navy
Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) . Background studies of the
original Smart Ship Project on the USS Yorktown will provide
insights on the implementation of Smart Ship on various ship
types. Recommendations for future research will also be
provided.
E . ORGANIZATION
This thesis will include five chapters. Chapter I
defines the problem and provides general background
information. Chapter II presents an overview of the Smart
Ship Project on USS Yorktown by reviewing past policy
attempts to reduce manning and analyzing current objectives
and progress
.
Chapter III will provide an overview of USS Rushmore's
Smart Gator Program, explaining policy and procedural
changes as well as related technology. Several initiatives
from NAVSEA's Engineering for Reduced Maintenance (ERM)
program will also be discussed. Important information
relating to Smart Gator will be provided based on interviews
with the Commanding Officer and a sample of crewmembers of
USS Rushmore, the Smart Gator Program Office at Commander
Amphibious Group Three, media reports, the Internet, as well
as program-related presentations and documentation.
Chapter IV will analyze the implementation and impact
of the Smart Gator Program by reviewing the results of the
USS Rushmore's Engineering Certification (E-Cert) . [Ref. 22]
Chapter V will contain conclusions on the impact of the
Smart Gator Program on USS Rushmore and recommendations to
enhance implementation on other amphibious ships. Future
applications on the USS San Antonio (LPD-17) and alternative
manpower reduction methods will also be discussed.
Recommendations for follow-on research will be based on






For many years, the United States Navy has watched
other sea going organizations use technology to reduce
manpower on vessels. Commercial freighters often conduct
trans-ocean passages with only one watchstander manning the
bridge, while the typical U.S. Navy vessel has a minimum of
ten personnel on a watchteam. The standard Navy underway
bridge watchbill consists of the officer of the deck (00D)
,
junior officer of the deck (JOOD) /conning officer,
quartermaster of the watch (QMOW) , boatswain's mate of the
watch (BMOW) , messenger of the watch (MOW) , helmsman,
leehelmsman, forward lookout, aft lookout and the signalman
of the watch (SMOW) . Numerous personnel who stand watches
in the combat information center (CIC) and engineering
spaces also assist the bridge watchstanders . For safety
reasons, this configuration increases in size during special




The Navy's traditional mentality of excellence through
redundancy has proven to be effective, if not efficient.
The United States has enjoyed maritime dominance for over
two hundred years due to the Navy's ability to achieve
mission success, regardless of the tasking. However, in the
post Cold War era, tradition and culture must give way to
technological innovation and new policy implementation.
Smart Ship provides one potential answer for the Navy's
maritime manning and mission concerns. It uses common sense
approaches, along with commercial off the shelf technology,
to reduce manning requirements for watchstations . However,
it is difficult to determine the overall effect of reduced
manning on a vessel's mission readiness. Fewer crewmembers
usually mean more working hours, particularly in the areas
of unscheduled, corrective maintenance and emergent repairs
that are common to the fleet. Consequently, longer working
hours reduces crew rest which directly impacts operational
efficiency and mission readiness.
B. PAST POLICY ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE MANNING
Reduced manning is not a new goal. As mentioned, the
Navy has benefited from indirect reduced manning in weapon
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systems and engineering. On several occasions the Navy has
attempted to benefit directly from reduced manning. Three
of these attempts occurred in the 1970' s. Two were in the
construction of new platforms, the Spruance class destroyer
(DD 963), and the Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigate
(FFG 7) . The third was in a program similar to Smart Ship
today, implemented on the test ship USS McCandless (FF 1084)
during the period of November 1976 to January 1977. [Ref.
3:p. 29]
In the development of the DD 963 class, roughly 22 5
crewmembers were originally assigned. The manning
requirements were based on a task analysis of maintenance
and watchstanding requirements. However, the Navy quickly
realized how minimally armed the warship was, and devised
ways to improve its combat power. In addition, the crew had
to be increased to meet maintenance requirements and
shipboard training. As a result, the present complement is
approximately 325-350. [Ref. 3:p. 30]
The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate was designed
under a concept entitled "high mix, low mix." The strategy
envisioned the need for highly capable and high cost
cruisers and destroyers to serve in areas of severe enemy
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threat, while less capable, less costly frigates served in
areas of low enemy threat. As a result, the low mix ships
received less attention in material condition and
maintenance from shore facilities. Crew size was not large
enough to complete repairs alone, and combat readiness
decreased. [Ref. 3:p. 30]
The ship control function has been viewed by many as an
overmanned requirement for decades. Both tradition and
decreased training opportunities have continued bridge
manning of over ten members per watch. Therefore, manpower
is diverted from other tasks such as maintenance and
administration in an attempt to keep ship control personnel
trained. The integrated bridge system (IBS), a significant
part of the Smart Ship technology was evaluated aboard the
USS McCandless for a period of three months. It proved that
watchstanding manning requirements could be reduced.
However, it was not seen as cost effective by Navy-
leadership. Specifically, there was a higher priority for
weapon and sensor development and acquisition. [Ref. 3:p.
30]
Other technological improvements which had the
potential to reduce manpower derived from a study by Purdue
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University in the 1960 's, funded through the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) . The study's purpose was to
evaluate the possibility of automating several processes
aboard destroyer escorts in an effort to reduce manning.
The Purdue University study offered a solution that included
adding computer technology aboard. However, the proposal
was determined not to be cost effective because the
reductions in crewmembers occurred only in the lower
paygrades, creating a more top heavy Navy. [Ref. 3:p. 31]
C. SMART SHIP PROJECT
1 . Background
In October 1995, the Naval Research Advisory Committee
(NRAC) briefed reduced manning concepts applicable to U. S.
Navy ships to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda.
[Ref. 6] The report revealed no specific laws, with the
exception of a requirement for a posted lookout, which
required the number of watchstanders Navy ships must
maintain. The report also stated that the major obstacle to
reduced manning and decreased life cycle costs aboard Navy
ships was culture and tradition rather than the lack of
proven technology or know-how. The challenge was to
demonstrate in an operational ship that reductions in
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workload and manpower requirements were possible while
maintaining mission readiness and safety. The panel
suggested the Navy shift its focus from using technology as
a tactical and operational benefit to using it as a means to
reduce manpower by improving personnel productivity. [Ref.
6]
With the theoretical studies complete, the reduced
manning initiatives needed to be proven at sea. The
Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
( COMNAVSURFLANT ) , was designated as the executive agent for
the Smart Ship Project and nominated USS Yorktown as the
ship in which to implement ideas to demonstrate- the concept.
[Ref. 7] Prior to Yorktown ' s approval, it was assigned to a
new homeport and to the Western Hemisphere Battlegroup that
operated in the Gulf of Mexico. This battlegroup was
specifically designed to deploy only four or five months in
the Caribbean to deter and track drug operations off the
coast of South America. [Ref. 8]
2 . Overview
Based on the NRAC findings, the Smart Ship Project team
set out to discover ideas to change the way the Navy equips
and mans ships . The directives the team received from
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Admiral Boorda were to challenge policy, culture, and
tradition that contributed to unproductive workload. Boorda
also tasked them to incorporate modern and current
technology, which could minimize human interface and improve
productivity. [Ref. 8]
As a part of the new technology, the Yorktown received
a fiber optic local area network (LAN) , an integrated bridge
system (IBS), a damage control system (DCS), an integrated
condition assessment system (ICAS), and a standard
monitoring and control system (SMCS) . The tactical action
officer (TAO) controlled all ship functions from CIC. A
fully qualified 00D was stationed on the bridge along with
three personnel to ensure safe navigation. [Ref. 8]
However, technology alone was not sufficient to
generate the anticipated 10-15 percent manpower reduction
that was required to produce a realistic return on
investment. Thus, the Smart Ship Project team and the crew
of the Yorktown realized that significant savings could best
be achieved through the following three initiatives:
(1) Revised policy and procedures
(2) Technology
(3) Improved maintenance methods
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D. USS YORKTOWN PROGRESS
1. Manpower reducing initiatives
The Yorktown employed the three manpower reducing
initiatives and experienced immediate results. According to
the Smart Ship Project Assessment Report from COMNAVSURFLANT
to the CNO in September 1997, [Ref. 9] the Yorktown used the
following methodology to achieve reductions in workload and
manpower requirements:
(a) Revised policy and procedures - Watch stations and
other workload were not assigned according to
conditions of readiness. An innovative Core Team/Flex
Team Watch Organization completely revamped the
traditional Condition I-IV manning concepts while
significantly reducing the number of people required
onboard. The new matrix was based on a "flex to
action" philosophy that allowed the watch team to focus
on watch-standing responsibilities and delegated
routine workload to a "day-worker" force. The
components of the matrix were "flexed" as needed to
perform necessary functions and relaxed back to a "core
team" as the situation allowed. Integral to this new
18
approach was a dedicated training department with a
Learning Resource Center.
(b) Technology Navigation, machinery control,
equipment condition and monitoring, and information
management systems were automated. These functions are
now performed by commercial off-the-shelf computer
equipment, integrated on a fiber optic local area
network (asynchronous transfer mode, or ATM LAN)
.
Wireless internal voice communication equipment was
used, which allowed instantaneous, multi-channel
communication among shipboard personnel
.
(c) Improved maintenance methods - Preventive
maintenance requirements were established using
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) methodology.
This improved approach reduced the scheduled preventive
maintenance workload by 15 percent. Material condition
of Yorktown equipment showed no degradation. Improved
corrosion control measures reduced preservation
workload for the crew.
2. Results
The COMNAVSURFLANT Smart Ship Project Assessment Report
also noted that all policy and procedure, technology, and
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maintenance initiatives reduced the total weekly workload by
more than 9000 hours (approximately 30 percent) . This
decrease in workload produced manpower reductions of 44
enlisted and 4 officers, which translated to a total
potential annual savings of $2,865 million. [Ref. 9]
When taken separately, technology did not produce a
reasonable return on investment. However, some of the
individual technologies were critical to the policy and
procedure changes. Particularly, the voyage management,
wireless internal voice communications, ATM LAN, and
machinery condition assessment systems were the cornerstones
for establishing new and more efficient procedures. More
importantly, these individual technologies, policy changes
and maintenance practice changes are readily transferable to
any ship, with a minor amount of tailoring. [Ref. 9]
The Yorktown has undergone a demanding assessment of
her ability to meet Required Operational
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE)
requirements since the outset of the Smart Ship Project.
The Afloat Training Group (ATG) , Propulsion Examination
Board (PEB) , NAVMAC, and Operational Testing and Evaluation
Force (OPTEVFOR) performed numerous independent assessments,
20
all of which indicated that the Yorktown performed
consistently well.
In February 1997, NAVMAC assessed Yorktown in terms of
man-hour availability and effective assignment of personnel
to watchstations during various evolutions and conditions of
readiness. NAVMAC concluded that Yorktown met the spirit of
the class ROC/POE, but did not literally comply with the
ROC/POE as written, with the variant being watchstanding
philosophy. [Ref. 9]
In March 1997, Yorktown was assessed by OPTEVFOR, which
concluded that Yorktown demonstrated the ability to execute
required operational missions with reduced manpower.
OPTEVFOR further recommended continued development,
demonstration, test, and evaluation of Smart Ship
initiatives. [Ref. 9]
With regards to sustainability, CNSL observed that a
primary concern of this assessment is whether the Smart Ship
concept is sustainable. Specifically, it must be determined
if a smaller crew can sustain the ship and its equipment, as
well as itself. The crew must get enough rest, training,
and leisure activity in order to perform at its best. Since
only a relatively short assessment period was available for
21
determination of sustainability, the analysis continues. No
significant degradations in crew rest or morale have been
noticed. [Ref. 9]
Future plans are to install the Smart Ship policy and
procedures on a deploying destroyer squadron for evaluation,
seek funding for proven technology backfit and forward fit
installations, and continue to search for more workload
savings via the Smart Ship Project. [Ref. 9] The concepts
are also being assessed on the amphibious ship, USS Rushmore
and the logistics support ship, USS Rainier (AOE-7).
However, unlike the Smart Ship Project on Yorktown, which is
fully funded, the type commander, Commander Naval Surface
Forces Pacific, funds the latter two efforts.
E. THE BIRTH OF THE SMART GATOR
Until 1996, most of the reduced manning initiatives
were attempted aboard combatants, with little regard given
to the applicability to amphibious and logistics support
ships. Differences in mission and manning requirements
indicated that not all Smart Ship concept initiatives were
transferable. In the fall of 1996, COMNAVSURFPAC selected
the amphibious dock landing ship, USS Rushmore, as its Smart
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Ship platform. COMNAVSURFPAC also joined with NAVSEA to
test equipment being implemented on the 21 st century
amphibious ship, USS San Antonio (LPD-17). COMNAVSURPAC
named the program "Gator-17," [Ref. 10] but for the purposes







The naval forces remain the most viable means for the
United States to respond rapidly to contingencies around the
world. On any given day, one third of the Navy's ships,
submarines, squadrons, and Marine units are deployed
overseas. [Ref. l:Ch.5]
However, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new
threat that required new strategies. The primary focus
shifted from open ocean to near-land missions. The new
emphasis for the Navy became amphibious operations,
including non-combative evacuation operations, humanitarian
assistance and amphibious assaults.
Amphibious ships are designed to carry out this wide
range of missions. Huge carrier battlegroups , surrounded by
numerous cruisers and destroyers dedicated to anti-air and
anti-submarine warfare, have become less important as
numerous Third World contingencies dictate a force capable
of responding in a littoral environment.
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The basic difference between the missions of cruisers,
like Yorktown, and amphibious ships, like Rushmore, is that
the cruiser delivers missiles while the amphibious ship
delivers troops. This inherent difference has always
guaranteed further dissimilarities in shipboard manning
requirements, equipment and battle bills, which reflect
watchstation assignment for shipboard personnel during
various states of readiness. Thus, it became necessary to
evaluate Smart Ship concepts on an amphibious ship.
2 . Chapter overview
Section B of this chapter discusses the Rushmore 's
Required Operational Capability in the Projected Operational
Environment (ROC/POE) , and provides insight to amphibious
Navy operations. Section C discusses the Smart Gator
Program, including information on manpower reduction
considerations, the NAVMAC analysis, as well as policy,
procedural, and technological changes onboard the Rushmore.
Section D provides the numerical results of the Smart Gator
Program manpower reduction efforts.
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B. THE USS RUSHMORE'S MISSION AND CAPABILITIES
1. ROC/POE ^
The missions, functions and tasks of all United States
warships are /-defined in the ship's Required Operational
Capability /in the Projected Operating Environment (ROC/POE) .
The ROC is a mission statement prepared by the warfare
sponsor detailing required capabilities in various
operational situations. The level of detail sets forth
which weapons will be available at varying degrees of
readiness (e.g., perform anti-air warfare with maximum
capability in condition of readiness I, partial capability
in condition of readiness III) . The POE is a description of
the specific operating environment in which the unit is
expected to operate. [Ref. 23:App. B]
2 . Mission and capabilities
The Rushmore ' s mission is to transport Marines and
their combat equipment to areas of interest around the
world, then launch and support landing craft and helicopters
during amphibious operations, as necessary. The Rushmore
carries up to four landing craft air cushioned vehicles
(LCAC) , each capable of carrying a 60-ton payload at speeds
in excess of 40 knots. These hovercraft allow the Navy to
27
conduct amphibious landings on previously inaccessible
beaches at distances that once were not operationally-
feasible .
The Rushmore accomplishes her mission through the use
of a 440-foot well deck that is flooded to launch and
recover landing craft. A flight deck is also available to
launch and land up to two CH-53E helicopters. The Navy's
latest combat communication systems, diesel propulsion,
engineering technology, and advanced repair facilities make
the Rushmore a formidable warship. Complete medical and
dental facilities and crew and troop berthings accommodate
up to 627 embarked Marines and 345 sailors. [Ref . 15]
C. THE SMART GATOR PROGRAM
The Gator 17 Vision Statement for Calendar Year 98 and
Beyond [Ref. 24] provides a detailed synopsis of the
Rushmore 's intended strategy with regards to the Smart Gator
Program. Core installations, other installed items, planned
or considered items, equipment removals, and policy and
procedural changes, are also included in detail.
Sections C.l and C.2 below provide background regarding
projected manpower reduction and return on investment of the
28
systems installed. Sections C.3 and C.4 specify policy,
procedural, and technological changes of the Rushmore
.
1. Determining Manpower Reduction and Return on
Investment
a) Shipboard manning
As stated in the Navy's Manpower Manual [Ref. 23],
the Navy's manpower requirements provide a dynamic system
for planning, programming, and budgeting total force
manpower resources to support the operating forces and the
shore establishment under peacetime and wartime conditions.
The Manpower Manual also establishes manpower requirements
through the following programs:
1) Ship Manpower Requirements Determination Program
(SMRDP) for Ship Manpower Documents/Fleet Manpower
Documents (SMDs/FMDs)
.
2) Aviation Manpower Requirements Determination
Program for Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMDs),
carrier air wings (CVWs) , Sea Operational
Detachments (SEAOPDET) Manpower Documents, afloat




3) Individual Account (IA) for non-force structure
manpower. [Ref. 23:p.2]
For the purpose of this thesis, only the Ship
Manpower Document determination elements will be addressed.
SMD requirements [Ref. 23 :p. 2-4] are determined by, but are
not limited to, the following development elements:
1) ROC/POE parameters and analysis (Operational
manning, wartime missions, functions and tasks)
.
2) Directed manpower requirements (Master Chief Petty






7) Application approved staffing standards (when
applicable)
.
8) On-site workload measurement and analysis.
9) Utility tasking (Underway replenishment, flight
operations, sea and anchor detail, etc)
.
10) Allowances (service diversion, productivity
allowance, etc).
11) Development of officer requirements.
12) Fleet review of draft documents.
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Thus, in order to conduct a complete shipboard
assessment for manpower reduction, each of the above listed
items should first be considered.
b) The NAVMAC projected manpower reduction and
return on investment
At the outset of the Smart Gator Program,
COMNAVSURFPAC requested NAVMAC and the Rushmore conduct a
thorough review of the ship's battle bill in order to
determine the most likely places for manpower reductions.
The total number of enlisted billets saved through policy-
changes, Smart technology and reduced maintenance would then
be multiplied by the workyear rate of $33,391 per enlisted
billet. [Ref. 12]
The initial projected savings of 42 enlisted
billets were applied to the eight million dollar cost of the
"core installation. " The core installation included the
fiber optic Local Area Network (LAN) , the Integrated Bridge
System (IBS), the Integrated Condition Assessment System
(ICAS) , Damage Control Quarters (DCQ) , Machinery Control
System (MCS) , and HYDRA II wireless communications system.
The projected savings of 42 billets, multiplied by $33,391
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per billet per year, produced a return on investment of $1.4
million per year over a six-year period. [Ref. 12]
2. The NAVMAC Analysis
Although the projected return on investment was very
attractive to COMNAVSURFPAC and NAVSEA, the NAVMAC analysis
considered only operational manning, which constitutes 25
percent of a sailor's total workload. [Refs. 17, 25] Thus,
the projected number of billets and the return on investment
were better than they would be if all items were included.
The manpower determination items represent a percentage of
each crewmember ' s total workload, and should be considered
when establishing any changes in a ship's manning.
Table 1 indicates the distribution of crewmembers
'
workload activities. Seventeen percent of a sailor's
workload is allowed for schools, leave, and other factors
that affect productivity. Own unit support for
administrative duties and shipboard housekeeping constitutes
another twenty percent. Facilities Maintenance, which
includes preservation, hull maintenance and repair,
constitutes fourteen percent. Training constitutes nine
percent, while corrective and planned maintenance combine
for fifteen percent. As previously mentioned, operational
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manning, which includes underway peacetime watchstanding,
constitutes twenty five percent of a sailor's total
workload. [Refs. 19, 25]
Essentially, COMNAVSURFPAC and NAVMAC agreed to base
manpower reduction calculations on the number of
watchstations saved through planned and installed
technology, and the Rushmore's Core/Flex Organization.
[Refs. 12, 17, 25] Thus, the reduction projections, as well
as the return on investment, were impressive to all
concerned.
Table 1. Crewmember ' s workload activity and percent of
total workload.
WORKLOAD ACTIVITY % OF TOTAL WORKLOAD
17 percent.-Allowances
^Own Unit Support 20 percent
• Facilities Maintenance 14 percent
^Training 9 percent
-Corrective Maintenance 5 percent
'Planned Maintenance 10 percent
"'Operational Manninq 25 percent
Total 100 percent
Source: USS Rushmore (LSD 47) Gator 17 Manpower
Reduction Brief of 7 July 1998 [Ref. 25]
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3 . Policy and procedural changes
Prior to the implementation of the Smart Gator Program,
the Rushmore's battle bill philosophy, administrative
procedures, and internal organization were similar to most
other ships in the U.S. Navy. Watchstations were manned to
react to any circumstance, and watchstanders conducted
routine maintenance actions during their off time.
However, the Rushmore currently assigns watchstations
and workload according to the Core/Flex organization, first
used onboard USS Yorktown (see Appendix A) . A Core Team of
45 watchstanders distributed among three sections does
routine watchstanding. The Flex Teams for evolutions are
comprised of Weapons Flex, Battle Quarters, Flight Quarters,
LCAC, Cargo Handling, Damage Control Quarters, Underway
Replenishment (UNREP) , Boat Operations, Man Overboard, Low
Visibility and Mine, and the Snoopy Reconnaissance Teams.
[Ref. 18]
Although teams differ in form and function from those
of the Yorktown, the flex to action philosophy remains the
same. Watchteams focus on watchstanding responsibilities,
and the day-workers focus on the routine workload. The
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components are flexed to action for special evolutions and
emergencies, as required.
In the Vision Statement promulgated in February 1998
[Ref. 24], the Rushmore implemented numerous other policy-
changes to improve efficiency, including:
1) A nine-section inport duty rotation that ensures all
personnel is on the watchbill except CO, XO and CMC.
No leave is authorized over duty days, unless an
equally qualified standby has agreed to take duty
and signs leave chit stating the same.
2) A Life Skills Afloat Training Program that is a
cooperative effort with the Family Services Center
was implemented to train personnel in financial
management, stress/anger management, effective
personnel communications, single sailor lifestyles,
and other related topics . The program produced a
significant reduction in counseling.
3) An Expanded Indoctrination Training policy was
established which mandates indoctrination for one
month and includes Life Skills Afloat training,
completion of initial Personnel Qualification
Standards (PQS), and shipboard familiarization.
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4) A short form awards processing policy was
established. The new policy reduces paperwork and
time consumed with the traditional awards process by
allowing a single sheet to be filled out.
5) A Corrosion Control Facility has been established as
a dedicated workcenter with both staffing and
appropriate tools
.
6) A thirty-percent Women At Sea integration goal has
been established on Rushmore . The standard "Women
at Sea" manning is set at ten percent. Rushmore has
identified and implemented a scheme allowing up to
thirty percent of the crew to be women with only
extremely low cost berthing modifications required,
promoting a more "normal" atmosphere onboard.
4 . Smart Gator Technology
a.) Core installations
As a test platform for Smart Gator technologies, the
Rushmore 's package is centered on a fiber optic Local Area
Network (LAN) system that includes five hubs and nine remote
computer-operating terminals. The password protected
terminals allow access to the Machinery Control System
(MCS) , the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) , the Integrated
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Condition Assessment System (ICAS), and the Damage Control
Quarters (DCQ) . An unclassified administrative network is
used for general administrative and supply functions.
Windows-based software is used to navigate the various
systems and operate equipment, as necessary. [Ref. 20]
b) Engineering for Reduced Maintenance (ERM)
In addition to USS San Antonio based technology,
Engineering for Reduced Maintenance initiatives are being
evaluated that will effect all ships. This cooperative
effort between the fleet and NAVSEA was formally established
in April 1996 to coordinate NAVSEA-wide actions required to
facilitate ERM efforts. [Ref. 14]
The objectives of ERM are to:
1) Reduce fleet maintenance costs.
2) Prioritize problems by cost and severity of impact
to ships and number of effected platforms.
3) Demonstrate on existing ships and systems.
4) Institutionalize corrective actions for future
repairs and new construction.
For example, tanks and voids repair and preservation
currently represent the number one annual maintenance cost
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to the U.S. Navy fleet, at over $244 million. [Ref. 13]
However, technology is available to significantly increase
the service expectancy of tank coatings. Studies show a one
billion dollars cost avoidance over twenty years for Pacific
Fleet surface ships and aircraft carriers, for a fifty one
to one return on investment. [Ref. 13 :p. 8]
The thirteen ERM initiatives focus on bilges, hull
maintenance, ventilation ducting, fan rooms and well deck
preservation, and are currently being evaluated on various
ships throughout the fleet. [Ref. 14] The use of state of
the art coating systems combined with good preparation
techniques may result in significant reductions in ship's
force maintenance.
c) Other installations
The Gator 17 Vision Statement [Ref. 24] provides a
detailed synopsis of all technologies installed on the
Rushmore . More than twenty different software programs are
associated with the core installations. More than fifteen
other workload reducing items have been scheduled for
installment, with more than sixty others being considered.
[Ref. 24]
D. ACTUAL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS
The Rushmore has 345 billets for full manpower
requirements. However, 34 of those billets are not funded,
resulting in 311 authorized billets. Based on NAVMAC '
s
assessment, battle bill restructuring and technology
installations, 42 billets were designated for reduction (see
Appendix B) . [Ref . 25] However, three quartermaster billets
were slated for removal based on the installation of the
Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) . Due to
insufficient chart coverage, ECDIS has not been approved by
NAVSEA for unlimited use aboard Navy vessels. Thus, the
three quartermaster billets were reinstated, bringing the
total reduction to 39 personnel. [Ref. 25]
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Measuring readiness for naval vessels has always been
extremely complex and dynamic. Readiness factors considered
include the number of outstanding Casualty Reports,
(CASREPs), 1 the time required to repair a casualty, the
level of readiness reported within the Status of Resources
and Training System (SORTS), 2 and individual grades on pre-
deployment departmental examinations, assessments, and
certifications. [Ref. 3]
1 CASREPs are submitted to area commanders reporting degradations in
mission capability. Commanding Officers are required to report equipment
malfunctions that cannot be corrected within 48 hours and that reduce
the ship's ability to perform its mission. CASREPs are rated on a scale
of two to four, with four being the most serious degradation to a
primary mission area. The percentage of time that a ship is free of
equipment problems that critically degrade its ability to perform its
mission is akin, in some respects, to a mission-capable rate. [Ref. 27]
2 SORTS is a system designed to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
assessing overall unit readiness. Units report the status of four
resource areas (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment
condition, and training) . Capability, or "C, " ratings on a scale of one
to five are assigned to report a unit's readiness. C-l indicates that a
unit can undertake the full wartime missions for which it was organized
and designed. C-5 indicates that a unit is undergoing a service-
directed resource change and is not prepared to undertake its wartime
missions. [Ref. 28]
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However, the most traditional indicator that a ship is
ready has been a combination of successfully passing pre-
deployment inspections, and safely conducting all
assignments, including deployments, on time and as designed.
Some have argued that too much weight was placed on the
former, and not enough on the latter. [Ref. 21]
The Navy's penchant for inspections and checklists came
about as a result of numerous safety problems experienced in
the 1960 's and 1970 's. Hundreds of lives were lost and
millions of dollars of equipment was damaged on Navy ships
due to unsafe operations, poor training, and poor
maintenance. [Ref. 21] However, in the early 1970 's, the
Surface Warfare community established a standardized
training program for officer and enlisted watchstanders , and
created the Propulsion Examination Board (PEB) to conduct
engineering inspections. Due the seriousness of the
engineering safety problems, PEB was given significant input
in the evaluation of a ship's readiness.
PEB was tasked to conduct the Operational Propulsion
Plant Examination (OPPE) , which quickly became the most
important event on every conventional ship's schedule. [Ref.
21] Many man-hours were consumed in preparation for an
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upcoming OPPE . Due to the distressing nature of the
inspection process, no captain, junior officer or sailor
wanted to ruin a promising career by failing this major
exam. [Ref. 21]
Other inspections were also implemented to review all
aspects of shipboard life. Administration, training, postal
services, weapons handling, and habitability were all
covered under separate inspections, or assist visits. Though
none was as weighty as OPPE, each was significant enough to
warrant countless man-hours during preparation, which
detracted from crewmember's quality of life. Consequently,
ships looked forward to deployment in order to escape the
continuous bombardment of pre-deployment inspections.
2 . The need for change
Although there is no substitute for good material
readiness, many ships became immune to the inspection
process. Experienced officers and chiefs ensured that
detailed checklists were used to conduct rehearsals and
assist visits, well before the actual inspection. Thus, an
inspection became more of a formality than a true assessment
of readiness in a given mission area. Until recently, many
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inspections and assist visits were redundant, time-consuming
and counter-productive. [Ref. 21]
Recognizing the need to improve the Navy's way of doing
business, the Chief of Naval Operations implemented a plan
to make the Navy more efficient and to improve the quality
of life of shipboard personnel. In September 1998, Admiral
Johnson released the Navy-wide, Inter-Deployment Training
Cycle (IDTC) Reductions message. [Ref. 26] His primary goal
was to reduce the workload of the operating forces. Through
cancellations and consolidations, the Surface Navy reduced
the number of inspections from over 140 to fewer than 20,
with additional consolidations still being reviewed. [Refs.
21,26] Although PEB still exists and conducts engineering
certifications, the emphasis is now on enhancing readiness,
as opposed to demanding it.
This action will potentially have an enormous impact on
the fleet. Not only could it reduce the workload, but it
may also change Navy culture. The Engineering Certification
is still the primary inspection for conventionally powered
ships; however, the most realistic measure of a ship's
readiness remains the ability to safely and successfully
complete deployment. [Ref. 21]
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3. Rushmore's Progress
The USS Rushmore is currently in the training and
workup phase while preparing for her June 1999 deployment to
the Western Pacific Ocean. However, at the time of this
study, the ship's most significant inspection was the E-Cert
conducted by the Pacific Fleet Propulsion Examining Board in
October 1998. [Ref. 17] For the purposes of this research,
the E-Cert report [Ref. 24], questionnaire answers,
observations, interview results, and all other pertinent
data will be used to determine the current impact of the
Smart Gator Program on the Rushmore's readiness.
4 . Chapter overview
This chapter answers the question whether the Smart
Gator Program has impacted the mission readiness of the USS
Rushmore. Section B reviews the results of the Rushmore's
E-Cert [Ref. 24], which also provides a measure of
readiness. Section C summarizes the results of the
interviews and questionnaires. Section D summarizes the
findings of this research, and indicates the advantages and
disadvantages of the Smart Gator Program.
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B. RUSHMORE 'S ENGINEERING CERTIFICATION RESULTS
In October 1998, CINCPACFLT PEB certified the USS
Rushmore for unrestricted operations and integrated
training. [Ref. 24] However, numerous technical problems
were experienced with Smart Gator related systems, such as
inadvertent alarms and system shutdowns. [Refs. 17, 24]
High priority material discrepancies for the Machinery
Control System included the starboard main reduction gear
lube oil strainer pressure differential and the port
controllable pitch propeller auxiliary oil pressures were
too high. Also, the main reduction gear lube oil header
pressure and most remote bearing sensors produced spurious
alarms. Alarms on these systems warrant immediate action
that may affect the ship's maneuverability and combat
effectiveness. Reliability and supportability of newly
installed equipment remain an issue. [Ref. 11,17]
C. INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
In order to identify the full measure of the Smart
Gator Program, it was necessary to interview personnel of
the Rushmore, and the staff of Amphibious Group Three
(PHIBGRU Three) . Additionally, relevant questions were asked
to COMNAVSURFPAC, Vice Admiral Edward Moore, during a brief
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to the Monterey Bay Chapter of the Surface Navy Association
in November 1998. [Ref. 21] The staff of SURFPAC is
responsible for the maintenance and operation of all surface
ships in the Pacific Fleet. PHIBGRU Three is responsible for
the maintenance and operation of the U.S. mainland-based,
Pacific Fleet amphibious ships, including the USS Rushmore
.
Appendix C lists twenty baseline questions that were
asked during formal interviews of key members of the Smart
Gator Program in July 1998. Although some of the questions
are not directly relevant to this study, they provide a
framework for assessing the overall Smart Ship Concept.
Rushmore personnel formally interviewed include the
Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Personnel Officer,
and Electronics Division Leading Chief Petty Officer.
Additionally, informal interviews consisting of spontaneous
questions were conducted with other enlisted and officer
watchstanders during research. Interviews were not limited
to the questions listed.
PHIBGRU Three personnel formally interviewed include
the Group Commander and the Group Material Officer, who also
serves as the Smart Gator Progam Manager. Additionally,
Commander, Naval Surface Force, Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral
47
Edward Moore, was informally interviewed following a brief
conducted in November 1998 at Naval Postgraduate School
[Ref. 21]
1 . Rushmore concerns
Overall, USS Rushmore personnel were enthusiastic about
the potential benefits of the technology. However, most of
the ship's senior leadership expressed major concerns about
the implementation of the Smart Gator Program. The most
significant issues raised during the interviews were as
follows. Manpower was reduced prior to the actual
installation of supporting Smart Gator Technology, and crew
training on the core installation was limited. Although
company representatives provided initial training on the new
equipment, minimal logistics support was available.
Technical documentation and associated operating manuals
were not available to use on a daily basis. Thus,
crewmembers received "on the job training, " and were forced
to develop their own qualification requirements for the
Smart Gator installations. Equipment reliability remains an
issue, until the installations can be fully evaluated in an
operational environment. Additionally, a lack of parts
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support and technical manuals made the ship dependent upon
contractors to fix all problems.
Most importantly, the crewmembers ' workload increased
dramatically due to the increase in training hours and
decreases in manning, which impacted other aspects of the
crew's workload.
The most noticeable area affected was the ship's
material readiness and maintenance. The reduction of
manpower and the increase in training time contributed
significantly to increasing each sailor's workload as
described in Chapter III. Consequently, during an April
pre-underway assessment, the Rushmore was deemed not ready
to commence the training cycle due to poor material
readiness. [Refs. 11,17,18] However, the E-Cert Report,
completed in October, indicates that Rushmore has returned
to a high state of material readiness. [Ref. 24]
2. SURFPAC and PHIBGRU THREE issues
The majority of the staff members were enthusiastic
about the entire program. However, concerns were expressed
about equipment supportability and warranty items. [Ref.
11] The initial costs of installation and testing are higher
than expected. Thus, since COMNAVSURFPAC is funding the
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entire program out-of-pocket, the Phase II installation has
been halted until further assessment of the Smart Gator core
installation benefits and savings. [Ref. 21]
In the meantime, the USS Rushmore will continue her
pre-deployment training cycle with the Core Installations
and other ERM initiatives onboard, thus providing an
opportunity for future studies.
D. SUMMARY
Based on the E-Cert report [Ref. 24], questionnaire
answers, observations, interview results, and other
pertinent data, the Rushmore 's mission readiness has been
impacted. Initially, the combination of increased workload
and reduced manning decreased material readiness, as the
crew adjusted to newly installed systems. However, the
officers and crew were able to adapt to the changes and pass
the demanding E-Cert . The most noticeable advantages and
disadvantages of the Smart Gator Program are listed below.
1. Advantages of Smart Gator
The primary advantages of the Smart Gator Program are
as follows. Command and control of the ship's functions are
improved. Watchstanders have an increased ability to
monitor shipboard operations due to the technology of the
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Integrated Condition Assessment, Integrated Bridge, and
Machinery Control Systems.
Less time is wasted on routine tasks, like logkeeping
and taking temperature readings . ICAS and MCS provide
constant updates of all necessary systems. Additionally,
the Commanding Officer and Chief Engineer can review logs
from computer terminals, as opposed to reading numerous log
records. Improved technology also allows remote operation
of the majority of engineering plant equipment.
The HYDRA II wireless communication system allows full
communication throughout the ship. The combination of the
HYDRA II and the DCQ system allows significant manpower
reduction during high combat readiness conditions. Fewer
phone talkers and plotters are needed for damage control
situations, thus reducing overall manning.
2. Disadvantages
The primary disadvantages include a lack of logistics
support (e.g., parts, manuals, warrantees, etc.) and
inadequate training provided for crewmembers . Also, poor
implementation procedures, like removing personnel prior to
installation and testing of supporting technology, created a
higher workload for the crewmembers. Finally, unreliable
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and untested equipment contributed to a higher than expected
initial cost which impacted SURFPAC's ability to fund Phase
II installations.
However, the overall effectiveness of the Smart Gator
Program can not be fully addressed until after the
Rushmore's deployment in June 1999.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Commanding Officers have always sought ways to operate
their ships more efficiently in order to enhance mission
readiness and reduce workload. The Smart Gator Program
concepts and technology provide potential answers for
Commanding Officers. The use of technology to conduct
mundane, time-consuming tasks, like logkeeping and taking
temperature readings, releases watchstanders from duties
which can be performed better by a computer.
Although many other sea-going organizations have used
computer technology to operate and monitor their vessels for
years, the tradition and culture of the U.S. Navy has often
stifled attempts to do the same. The practice of manning
ships in order to provide redundancy at every watchstation
has proven to be effective over the Navy's history. However,
reduced military budgets, increasing manpower costs, and
leading edge technology, have combined to encourage the Navy
to look into methods of reduce manning, like Smart Gator.
However, the effective implementation of Smart Gator can
only be realized by proving that the benefits of
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implementing the concepts, and installing high technology
equipment, outweigh the costs of the program.
However, in order for a fair assessment of any new
concept or technology, the implementation process must be
above reproach. If a system is designed to reduce manpower,
it stands to reason that the system must be installed, and
fully tested, in order to determine its total impact on
shipboard operations. Implementation in any other manner is
unfair to the concept, and more importantly, to the crew.
The addition of any new equipment requires substantial
training for those who operate and maintain the ship. As
indicated in Chapter III, training and overall maintenance
comprise a large portion of a sailor's workload, at almost
40 percent by some estimates. The installation and testing
of new equipment of this magnitude, while simultaneously
working up for deployment, seems counterproductive, at best.
However, it is the ship's crew that suffers most when the
workload is increased. More than likely, the ship and its
crew will continue to complete any task assigned, in spite
of the increased workload.
Another significant issue is funding. Although the
Core/Flex organization provides manpower savings that can be
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implemented on any ship, certain billets, like phone talker,
cannot be reduced without the Core Installation equipment.
Research and Development funds must be dedicated to this
effort at a level much higher than the type commander
(SURFPAC) is able to provide. As a result of insufficient
funding, the Navy may never know the optimum number of
personnel required to man a ship, or if the Smart Gator
Program is cost effective. Also, if using the Rushmore as a
test platform for the USS San Antonio technology is not
properly funded to support complete test and evaluation, the
Navy may never determine if the Smart Gator Program is cost
effective
.
The implementation of the Smart Gator Program during
the pre-deployment cycle had a negative impact on the
readiness of the Rushmore. However, given time to
operationally test the installations and to train the crew,
the Rushmore may regain maximum readiness prior to
deployment. With careful planning, the Smart Gator Program





This scope of this research effort supports the Smart
Gator Program. The findings have led to the following
conclusions concerning the impact of the Smart Gator Program
on the mission readiness of the USS Rushmore:
1) NAVMAC Analysis. The initial man-hour assessment
conducted by NAVMAC did not cover the crewmember's
full workload. Only the operational manning portion
was considered, which constitutes 25 percent.
Thus, the projected billets saved and return on
investments were probably better than they would be
if all components were considered.
2) Funding. Insufficient funding of the program has
led to a temporary stoppage of equipment
installations
.
3) Supportability . The reliability and supportability
of the equipment was considered unreasonably low.
Technical documentation and logistics support
should have been included as part of the initial
package. The non-availability of technical
documentation also prevents the ship's crew from
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troubleshooting minor problems and costs the Navy
for additional visits by contractors.
4) Smart Gator Program assessment. The implementation
of the Smart Gator Program during the pre-
deployment workup cycle, in conjunction with the
premature reduction of manpower, initially produced




Based on the conclusions of this research, the
following recommendations are made:
1) NAVMAC Analysis. A complete NAVMAC analysis should
be conducted, taking into account all facets of
shipboard personnel workload. Return on investments
can then be recalculated.
2) Funding. Navy research and development funds must
be dedicated to this effort in order to obtain a
fair assessment. Financial support must be provided
from levels higher than that of the type commander.
Navy Research and Development funds should be
dedicated to this effort.
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3) Supportability . Parts and technical support must be
provided. The ship must have the capability to
fully train with the new equipment, and maintain and
conduct repairs as necessary.
4) Smart Gator Program assessment. Similar to the
Yorktown's effort, the Operational Test and
Evaluation Force must conduct an operational
assessment of the USS Rushmore in the Projected
Operating Environment. A post -deployment assessment
will help determine the full effectiveness of the
program.
D. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH
This thesis evaluated the impact of the Smart Gator
Program on the mission readiness of the USS Rushmore. Since
readiness is a multi-faceted moving target that can best be
•evaluated following a ship's deployment, the scope of this
study was limited. However, the issues surrounding this
complex topic present a myriad of opportunities for future
study. The following areas are recommended for further
research:
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1) Conduct an assessment of the impact of Smart Gator
Technology on mission readiness following
deployment
.
2) Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of Smart Gator using
the proposed NAVMAC analysis.
3) Conduct an optimal manning analysis of Smart Gator
to determine the optimal number of personnel
required to operate and fight Smart Gator.
4) Analyze Smart Gator equipment reliability rates
following deployment. Also, review the impact of
sustainability issues (e.g., impact on manhours,





USS RUSHMORE (LSD 47) CORE/FLEX ORGANIZATION
CORE (3 SECTIONS)
Bridge OOD CIC CICWO RADIO SUPVR










NOTE: ALL FLEX TEAMS LISTED BELOW ARE SUPPLEMENTS TO THE CORE TEAM











CIC DRT GUNS LCP/MT PREP RADIO CWO
CIC NAV PLOT TTY
EW SUPVR OUTROUTER
VERT PLOT
SURF PLOT SIGS SIG SPOTTER








NOTE: BATTLE QUARTERS, WEAPONS FLEX AND DC QUARTERS ARE COMPLETELY
EVOLUTIONS, AND ONLY THE SPECIFIC TEAM CALLED AWAY WILL RESPOND.
ALL GUN MOUNT PERSONNEL WILL MUSTER, AND PERSONNEL NOT ACTUALLY
GUN MOUNT WILL BE LOADERS FOR CHAFF AND CIWS.
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FLIGHT QUARTERS (WHITE TEAM)
HCO NR 1 T/L
FDSO NR 2 T/L
LSE NR 1 HOSE




NOTE: ALL FOUR LSE'S AND ALL FOUR JP5 FUEL PERSONNEL WILL BE CROSS-TRAINED
TO CHOCK AND CHAIN. THE BACK UP FIRE PARTY WILL CONSIST OF THE LSE'S NOT BEING
USED AND THE JP5 FUEL PERSONNEL
WHEN CONDUCTING TWO SPOT OPS, THE CHOCK AND CHAIN PERSONNEL WILL BE
FOUR OF THE STRETCHER BEARERS
WHEN WHITE TEAM IS USED FOR DC, THE FOLLOWING APPLIES:
WHITE L/L















NOTE: FUELING PERSONNEL ALSO FUEL HELOS, THEREFORE THE ONLY DELAY TO











NOTE: The cargo handling positions are supplements to the LCAC, LCU/LCM or AAV evolutions.
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DAMAGE CONTROL QUARTERS
DCA REDL/L BLUE L/L
R/R RED S/L BLUE S/L
CRT RED T/L BLUE T/L
RED HOSE BLUE HOSE
ISOLATION BATTLE MESSING







NOTE: ELECTRICIANS ARE FROM R/R AMD CRT RESPONDS ONLY WHEN INDIVIDUALLY
CALLED AWAY.
ITOTAL PERSONNEL: 240 |
UNREP
MASTER HELM FLAGBAG OPR RIGGER
LEE HELM SIG MSGR/REC LINE HANDLER
L/O SIG LOG KEEPER FUEL SAMPLEfl
AFT STRG SAFETY RIG CAPTAIN CORPSMAN
CSE/SPD REC STAT SIG PDL SAFETY
HELM SAFETY GUNNER PDL GUNNER




SAFETY POIC WINCH OP
BOAT OFF LNPO WINCH CHECK
COXSWAIN FWD BLK LN SEA PAINTER
BOW HOOK ENG AFT BLK LN LIZZARD LN























USS RUSHMORE (LSD 47) MANPOWER STATUS









DC 12 13 11 10 2
DK 2 2 2 2
DT 3 3 3 3
EM 12 11 10 9
EN 48 44 43 43 8
ET 10 10 10 9 Add 3 ET's
EW 4 4 4 4
FC 4 5 4 5
FN(M) 15 19 13 9 6
FN 5 NA 7 8
GM 4 4 6 6
HM 7 7 7 7 1
HT 8 7 6 7 1
IC 6 6 6 8 1
JO 1 1 1 1
MA 1 1 1 1
MM 3 3 4 4 1
MR 1 1 1 1
MS 16 18 19 16 1
NC 1 1 1 1
OS 15 16 14 15
PC 1 1 2 1
PN 3 4 4 4
QM 5 6 5 5 3
RM 13 13 11 11 3
SH 6 7 8 8
SK 8 9 11 11
SM 6 8 6 5 4
SN(M) 15 39 17 17 8
SN(F) 18 NA 25 25
YN 4 5 6 5 1
3MC 1 1 1 1
CMC 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 278 290 286 280 42-3=39
NMP - NAVY MANNING PLAN
BA - BILLETS AUTHORIZED (FUNDED)
COB -CURRENT ON BOARD
ACOB - ACTUAL CURRENT ON BOARD
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APPENDIX C - Smart Gator Questionnaire
LCDR Cedric E. Pringle 22 Jul 98
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93945
Thesis title -Smart Gator: An Analysis of the Impact ofReduced Manning on U.S. Naval
Amphibious Ships
Smart Gator Questionnaire
Note: The questions and answers contained in this questionnaire are strictly for thesis
research purposes. Please answer them to the best of your ability. Several questions
request supporting documentation, if available (boldface questions). This interview may
be recorded to enhance the quality of the research. Thank you.
1 . In your own words, what is the mission statement of the Smart Ship Concept?
2. What is the Navy's intention with the Smart Ship Program? Full/Partial
implementation? Experimental?
3. How was USS Rushmore (LSD-47) chosen for the CNSP Smart Ship platform?
When was the program initiated on the USS Rushmore?
4. Does the wide array of auxiliary equipment and the diesel propulsion system on USS
Rushmore enhance the technical implementation of Smart Ship, or hinder it?
5. Does the design of the USS Rushmore enhance organizational changes, or hinder
them (e.g., Damage Control, Sea & Anchor, etc)?
6. How many initiatives have been implemented on the USS Rushmore? Is
implementation complete?
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7. What changes have been made to the manning requirements of the USS
Rushmore? Where are the most significant manpower savings?
8. What methods are most effective in training crewmembers on the operation and
maintenance of the new equipment?
9. What has been the most difficult aspect of implementation?
10. What are some other problems or concerns with the Smart Ship initiative? What
has been done to correct these problems?
1 1
.
Specifically, what are the ship's organization and watchbill changes?
12. Is the Smart Ship organization more efficient? Is it more effective?
13. How has the mission readiness and capabilities been affected?
14. How has the PMS program been altered to enhance reduced manning?
15. Is the USS Rushmore scheduled to deploy soon?
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16. Does the diversity and inherent danger of amphibious operations make manpower
reductions less desirable than on a cruiser or destroyer?
17. How has the Smart Ship initiative affected shipboard morale?
18. Has quality of life improved? Have working hours been affected?
19. How do you plan to assess the success of the program? What criteria will you
use?
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